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S U M M A R Y
President Donald Trump’s environmental policies appear detrimental to the environmental justice (EJ) move-
ment, but little work has been done to test their true impact on EJ. This Article offers a method for evaluating 
progress (or lack thereof) across the last three presidential administrations, proposing three metrics for prog-
ress: access to legal recourse, consideration of climate change as an EJ issue, and signaling actions. Using 
Robert Kuehn’s taxonomy of EJ, it concludes that while not much may be said to have actually been gained or 
lost in terms of distributive or corrective justice, significant progress was made toward procedural and social 
justice under President Barack Obama and lost under President Trump. This comparison helps to resolve 
competing narratives and provides a framework to encourage further comparisons across additional metrics.
Since taking office in January 2017, President Donald Trump has proposed or completed rollbacks of nearly 100 environmental regulations, repeatedly rejected 
calls for action on climate change, and continuously 
sought to cut funding for the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) and particularly for environmental 
justice (EJ).1 Given that poor and minority communities 
have historically borne a disproportionate amount of envi-
ronmental burden2 and are expected to be most severely 
impacted by climate change,3 these regressive policies seem 
likely to harm these same communities most, especially 
as they followed what many saw as promising EJ progress 
under President Barack Obama.4 But since many of the 
climate regulations enacted under President Obama were 
1. See infra Sections II.B.3, II.C.3.
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. See, e.g., Uma Outka & Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Reversing Course on En-
vironmental Justice Under the Trump Administration, 54 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 393 (2019) (arguing that the Trump Administration has set back the 
cause of EJ); Brie D. Sherwin, The Upside Down: A New Reality for Science 
at the EPA and Its Impact on Environmental Justice, 27 N.Y.U. Env’t L.J. 
57 (2019) (arguing that the Trump Administration’s attack on science and 
reduced enforcement of environmental laws have particular consequences 
for communities already impacted by environmental injustice).
rescinded before they had a chance to create any measur-
able impact,5 and the U.S. Congress has largely ignored the 
president’s calls for cuts to funding,6 how are these policy 
changes actually impacting the cause of EJ? How can we 
assess actual progress toward the multifaceted goals of EJ 
over the past 20 years?
While others have evaluated the progress and setbacks 
made by individual administrations toward achieving EJ,7 
the absence of a universal understanding of the goals of the 
movement8 and clear, reported metrics across administra-
tions9 have made an assessment of progress across adminis-
5. See infra Section II.B.3.
6. See infra note 209.
7. See, e.g., Maurie Cohen, George W. Bush and the Environmental Protection 
Agency: A Midterm Appraisal, 17 Soc’y & Nat. Resources 69 (2004) (evalu-
ating progress made during the George W. Bush Administration); Benjamin 
Wilson et al., The State of Environmental Justice: An Obama Administration 
Retrospective, 47 ELR 10385 (May 2017) (examining progress made during 
the Obama Administration); Jeanne Zokovitch Paben, Plan EJ 2014: Fact 
or Fiction? A Critique of the Obama Administration’s Efforts on Environmental 
Justice, 41 Wm. & Mary Env’t L. & Pol’y Rev. 1 (2016) (same); Marianne 
Engelman Lado, No More Excuses: Building a New Vision of Civil Rights 
Enforcement in the Context of Environmental Justice, 22 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. 
Change 281, 301-06 (2019) (critiquing the “measured steps forward dur-
ing the Obama administration” as “too little, too late”); Outka & Warner, 
supra note 4 (examining the reversal of progress under President Trump); 
Sherwin, supra note 4 (same).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
Author’s Note: Special thanks to Prof. Michael Pappas for 
his patient guidance and encouragement.
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trations difficult. This Article builds on previous literature 
by proposing three alternative metrics for progress, and 
evaluating the actions of the George W. Bush, Obama, 
and Trump Administrations on each using Robert Kuehn’s 
influential four-part taxonomy of EJ.10 By identifying spe-
cific metrics for comparison and applying a comprehensive 
framework for evaluation, the Article helps to reconcile 
competing narratives: that the Trump Administration has 
completely destroyed the progress made toward EJ under 
the Obama Administration; and that there was no real 
substantive progress there to reverse.
As the analysis below shows, whether EJ has been 
advanced or hindered by recent administrations depends 
in part on the notion of justice (distributive, procedural, 
corrective, or social) considered. Throughout all three 
administrations, actual progress toward distributive and 
corrective justice, best embodied here by the metric of 
access to legal recourse, has remained fairly limited. Thus, 
the Trump Administration has had little impact on these 
limited EJ gains. The most apparent EJ progress during the 
three administrations was made under President Obama, 
in the form of procedural and social justice, embodied here 
by consideration of climate change as an EJ issue and pub-
lic signaling of a commitment to EJ. It was these advances, 
which were primarily procedural and social, that were lost 
by the reversal of course under President Trump.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a basic 
history of the EJ movement and an introduction to Kuehn’s 
four-part taxonomy of EJ. Part II begins with an explanation 
of the difficulties encountered when comparing EJ efforts 
across administrations, then identifies the three alternative 
metrics examined here, assessing each in light of Kuehn’s 
taxonomy: Section II.A compares availability of legal 
recourse for EJ claims; Section II.B compares each admin-
istration’s consideration of climate change and its impacts 
on EJ communities; and Section II.C compares adminis-
trative actions that functionally signal the importance of 
the issues, such as proposed funding for EJ, involvement 
in the Environmental Justice Interagency Working Group 
(EJ IWG), and consideration of EJ in rulemaking. Part III 
summarizes the impacts of executive actions by the Bush, 
Obama, and Trump Administrations, concluding that the 
most significant setbacks under the Trump Administration 
are to the procedural and social aspects of EJ.
Where the Obama Administration demonstrated an 
increased commitment to the EJ movement, publicly rec-
ognizing the underlying social and economic inequities 
that drive environmental injustice and seeking to actively 
involve affected communities in implementing changes, 
the Trump Administration has actively backed away from 
this commitment and disavowed this recognition. Such 
actions represent a loss in their own right, and also a loss 
toward achieving more substantive distributive and correc-
tive justice in the future.
10. See generally Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ELR 
10681 (Sept. 2000).
I. Background
What has become known as the EJ movement has 
addressed a broad range of concerns over the years and has 
never had one universally agreed-upon meaning, but has 
instead been said to mean “many things to many people.”11 
Given the movement’s broad and diverse roots, explained 
in brief below, this Article adopts Kuehn’s taxonomy of EJ 
as a framework for understanding the movement’s goals 
and assessing the impacts of federal government actions 
across the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations.
A. History and Meaning of EJ
At its most basic, the term “environmental justice” refers 
to a set of concerns that examine “the relationship of envi-
ronmental quality to race and class.”12 More specifically, 
EJ is often described as addressing the unequal distribu-
tion of environmental benefits and burdens, where the 
burden is disproportionally borne by poor communities 
and communities of color, while the benefits are dispro-
portionately enjoyed by wealthier, whiter communities.13 
Importantly, however, the EJ movement is at its heart a 
grassroots one, in which progress has most often been 
driven by affected communities themselves,14 and is thus 
not only concerned with a fair outcome, but also with fair 
participation and treatment.15
11. Id. at 10681.
12. Id.
13. See generally Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1994 & Supp. VI 1998) [hereinafter Exec. 
Order No. 12898] (identifying “an agency-wide environmental justice 
strategy” as one that “identifies and addresses disproportionately high and 
adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, 
and activities on minority populations and low-income populations”); see 
also Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10388 (explaining that “while EJ is ab-
solutely about reducing and minimizing the risk of exposure to pollution 
and those bad impacts, it’s also about equal access to the good, to services 
and amenities”).
14. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environ-
mental Laws and Justice, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 221, 226 (1997) (describing 
“most of the participants in the environmental justice movement [as] com-
munity groups engaging in local action within their communities”); see 
also Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the United States, 
18 Yale J. Int’l L. 319, 329 (1993) (crediting grassroots groups not only 
for the pressure they put on EPA, but also for direct action that has forced 
changes in policy).
15. See, e.g., EJnet.org, Principles of Environmental Justice, http://www.ejnet.
org/ej/principles.html (last modified Apr. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Principles 
of Environmental Justice] (developed at the first National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit and affirming, among other things, 
“the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and environmental 
self-determination of all peoples” and demanding, among other things, “the 
right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-making”); 
see also Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10688 (identifying “procedural justice,” 
or “focus[ing] on the fairness of the decision-making process, rather than 
on its outcome,” as one of the four dimensions of justice the EJ move-
ment seeks to address); Kaswan, supra note 14, at 223 (identifying “po-
litical justice,” or “justice in the decision-making processes that determine 
the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens,” as one of the two 
forms of justice raised by the EJ movement); Robert D. Bullard, United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Environment, 
and Morality: Confronting Environmental Racism in the United 
States 6 (2014) (identifying “procedural equity,” defined as “the extent to 
which governing rules, regulations, evaluation criteria and enforcement are 
applied uniformly and in a non-discriminatory way,” as one of the three eq-
uities inherent in EJ); David Schlosberg, Reconceiving Environmental Justice: 
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One common view of the EJ movement is that it was 
grounded in the civil rights movement.16 During the 
1960s, “individuals, primarily people of color, who sought 
to address the inequity of environmental protection in 
their communities . . . sounded the alarm about the public 
health dangers for their families, their communities and 
themselves.”17 Early awareness primarily focused on the 
disproportionate siting of locally undesirable land uses, 
such as waste facilities, in poor and minority communi-
ties.18 In 1982, a nonviolent action protesting the siting of 
a toxic waste landfill in the predominantly African-Amer-
ican community of Warren County, North Carolina, was 
one of the first cases to gain national attention.19 While 
unsuccessful in stopping construction of the landfill, the 
protest sparked national conversation about the unequal 
distribution of environmental burdens and prompted the 
U.S. General Accounting Office (now the U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO)) to study environmen-
tal racism for the first time.20
The GAO report and a subsequent report by the United 
Church of Christ Commission on Racial Justice established 
for the first time a clear correlation between race and the 
siting of hazardous waste facilities.21 Though such studies 
did not necessarily prove causality, they were viewed as evi-
dence “that siting decisions were at worst discriminatory, 
[or] at best disproportionate.”22 In either case, advocates 
argued that “[t]he result of these patterns is that minorities 
pay the pollution costs of industrial production, while the 
benefits accrue to society in general.”23
Some scholars have also credited “a variety of other 
social movements,” such as the anti-toxics movement, the 
movement for Native American sovereignty, and the labor 
movement, for helping to shape the EJ movement.24 The 
anti-toxics movement, for example, “came to view discrete 
toxic assaults as part of an economic structure” that favored 
corporate power and lent its vision for dismantling such 
structures to the EJ movement25; while Native American 
Global Movements and Political Theories, 13 Env’t Pol. 517, 528 (2004) 
(identifying “participation” as a key element of EJ).
16. Clifford J. Villa, Environmental Justice for a New Era 8 (2020) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author); Luke W. Cole, Environmental 
Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
523, 530 (1994); U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice, https://www.epa.gov/
environmentaljustice (last updated Oct. 22, 2020).
17. U.S. EPA, supra note 16. See also Bullard, supra note 15, at 21 (“The envi-
ronmental justice movement emerged in response to environmental inequi-
ties, threats to public health, unequal protection, differential enforcement 
and disparate treatment received by the poor and people of colour.”).
18. U.S. EPA, supra note 16.
19. Id. See also Villa, supra note 16, at 4-5.
20. U.S. EPA, supra note 16; GAO, GAO/RCED-83-168, Siting of Hazard-
ous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation With Racial and Eco-
nomic Status of Surrounding Communities (1983).
21. See generally GAO, supra note 20 (one of the first studies establishing this 
connection); Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of 
Christ, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States xiii (1987) (find-
ing “race to be the most significant among variables tested in association 
with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities”).
22. Frank P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law §9.10 (2019).
23. Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Dis-
crimination, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. 271, 273 (1992).
24. Luke W. Cole & Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environ-
mental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Move-
ment 19-30 (2001).
25. Id. at 23.
struggles for sovereignty and the labor movement, particu-
larly the fight for farmworkers’ rights, “helped define one 
of [the movement’s] central philosophies, the concept of 
self-determination.”26
By the late 1980s, various citizen groups were spring-
ing up around the country in response to EJ issues. West 
Harlem Environmental Action (WE ACT) was founded 
in 1987 to improve environmental and health quality in 
communities of color.27 In 1990, “the Indigenous Environ-
mental Network (IEN) was formed by grassroots Indige-
nous peoples and individuals to address environmental and 
economic justice issues by building economically sustain-
able communities”; and the Southwest Network for Envi-
ronmental and Economic Justice was formed to “empower 
communities and workers to impact local, state, regional, 
national, and international policy on environmental and 
economic justice issues.”28
In 1990, the Congressional Black Caucus met with EPA 
to discuss disproportionate environmental risks to Black 
communities, and the federal government took its first steps 
to address the issues: creating the Environmental Equity 
Working Group and two years later establishing the Office 
of Environmental Equity.29 Also of pivotal importance was 
the first National People of Color Environmental Leader-
ship Summit held in Washington, D.C., in October 1991 
and attended by more than 1,000 delegates from around 
the world.30 At this summit, the delegates drafted and 
adopted 17 “Principles of Environmental Justice,” which 
embody a comprehensive notion of EJ and which continue 
to serve as a defining document for the movement.31
Though Congress rejected federal EJ legislation in the 
early 1990s,32 the movement was finally recognized in 
federal policy in 1995 when President Bill Clinton signed 
Executive Order No. 12898, directing federal agencies 
to consider EJ issues in decisionmaking.33 The Executive 
Order requires each agency to “make achieving envi-
ronmental justice part of its mission,” and to “develop 
an agency-wide environmental justice strategy.”34 It also 
ordered the creation of the EJ IWG to help guide and coor-
dinate governmentwide EJ efforts.35
Given the diverse roots of EJ and the different goals 
it encompasses, federal recognition has struggled to fully 
capture the complexity of the movement. The term “envi-
ronmental justice” was not explicitly defined in Presi-
dent Clinton’s Executive Order itself, but the problem 
was described therein as “the disproportionately high 
and adverse human health or environmental effects .  .  . 
26. Id. at 27-28.
27. U.S. EPA, supra note 16.
28. Id.
29. Renamed the Office of Environmental Justice (OEJ) in 1994. Id.
30. Bullard, supra note 15, at 5.
31. Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 15.
32. See, e.g., Environmental Justice Act, H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993). No-
tably, federal EJ legislation has been proposed and rejected every year since 
1992. Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10389.
33. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 394 (citing Exec. Order No. 12898, supra 
note 13).
34. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 13, at §§1-101, 1-103.
35. Id. at §1-102.
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on minority populations and low-income populations.”36 
Notable here is the focus primarily on the distributive 
aspects of EJ as well as the addition of “low-income popu-
lations” to the definition of those affected, which broad-
ened the focus beyond race.37 Also notable was President 
Clinton’s embrace of the term “environmental justice,” 
replacing the term used by EPA at the time, “environmen-
tal equity,” and avoiding use of the potentially more con-
troversial term, “environmental racism.”38
In the time since, the government has further broadened 
its definition of “environmental justice” to include impacts 
on “all people,” rather than focusing on the impacts on 
poor and minority populations, and to consider not only 
the disproportionate distribution of environmental bur-
dens, but also unequal representation in environmental 
decisionmaking processes.39 As such, EPA now defines 
“environmental justice” in the following way:
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all peo-
ple regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, 
with respect to the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and 
policies. This goal will be achieved when everyone enjoys: 
the same degree of protection from environmental and 
health hazards, and equal access to the decision-making 
process to have a healthy environment in which to live, 
learn, and work.40
Under President Bush, EPA’s approach to EJ has been 
described as embodying this more race-neutral definition, 
consistently “de-emphasizing minority and low-income 
populations and emphasizing the concept of environmen-
tal justice for everyone.”41 According to a 2004 report from 
the Office of Inspector General (OIG), “[t]he interpretation 
that environmental justice is for everyone, while consistent 
with the Agency’s overall mission, moved the Agency’s 
environmental justice focus away from minority and low-
income populations,” even though “the Executive Order 
was issued in an attempt to draw more attention to this 
specific part of the population.”42 While EPA agreed that 
the intent of the Executive Order “is to address environ-
mental justice concerns in minority and/or low-income 
populations,” the Agency also “assert[ed] its firm belief that 
36. Id. at §§1-101, 1-102(b), 1-103(a), 3-302(a).
37. Villa, supra note 16, at 4.
38. Id. at 13-14 (suggesting several reasons for the shift away from use of the 
term “environmental racism” despite the fact that clearly “race still matters” 
today); Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10682 (explaining the disagreement over 
whether the term “environmental racism” requires intentional conduct or 
also embraces disproportionate impacts and the “desire to encompass class 
concerns” as well as race).
39. U.S. EPA, supra note 16.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Villa, supra note 16, at 23 (citing Office of Inspector General, U.S. 
EPA, Report No. 2004-P-00007, EPA Needs to Consistently Imple-
ment the Intent of the Executive Order on Environmental Justice 
10 (2004) [hereinafter OIG 2004] (citing Memorandum from Christine 
Todd Whitman, Administrator, U.S. EPA, to Assistant Administrators 
et al., U.S. EPA, EPA’s Commitment to Environmental Justice (Aug. 9, 
2001))).
42. OIG 2004, supra note 41, at 10-11.
‘environmental justice belongs to all people.’”43 Notably, 
although the Obama Administration has generally been 
credited for refocusing efforts on EJ, EPA’s definition has 
retained not only the dual focus on meaningful involve-
ment and fair distribution of environmental risks and ben-
efits, but also the “all people” language.44
B. Kuehn’s Taxonomy of EJ
In order then to evaluate progress toward EJ, we must first 
define what we mean by “justice.” Numerous EJ activists 
and scholars have sought to identify the interconnected 
conceptions of justice “embodied in the concept of envi-
ronmental justice,” and there is no shortage of frameworks 
to choose from.45 This Article adopts Kuehn’s four-part 
taxonomy of EJ, which builds on the work of philosophers 
and scholars before him to create the most comprehensive 
framework, identifying four traditional notions of justice 
implicated by EJ claims: distributive, procedural, correc-
tive, and social justice.46
“Distributive justice” is the element of justice most 
commonly considered in the EJ context,47 and can be 
defined as “‘the right to equal treatment, that is, to the 
same distribution of goods and opportunities as anyone 
else has or is given.’”48 Kuehn describes this notion of jus-
tice as focused on a fair distribution of outcomes, not nec-
essarily a fair process.49
The EJ movement, however, has always been about more 
than just fair outcomes.50 Like some other EJ frameworks,51 
Kuehn’s taxonomy accounts for the broad range of goals 
sought by the movement52 by requiring not only fair out-
comes (distributive justice), but also fairness in decision-
making—what Kuehn calls procedural justice53—and a 
43. Villa, supra note 16, at 24 (quoting U.S. EPA, Agency Statement on the 
Inspector General’s Report on EPA’s Environmental Justice Imple-
mentation 1 (2004)).
44. Id. at 28.
45. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10682; see also Bullard, supra note 15, at 6 (dis-
tilling equity into three broad categories: procedural, geographic, and so-
cial); Kaswan, supra note 14, at 223 (distinguishing between “the two forms 
of justice raised by the movement: (1) justice in the existing distribution of 
environmental benefits and burdens (‘distributional justice’), and (2) justice 
in the decisionmaking processes that determine the distribution of environ-
mental benefits and burdens (‘political justice’)”); Schlosberg, supra note 15, 
at 528 (identifying three “intricately linked” elements of justice: distribu-
tion, participation, and recognition).
46. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10681.
47. Id. at 10683 (“Of the four aspects of justice implicated by the use of the 
term environmental justice, distributive justice concerns have received 
the most attention from government officials, scholars, and communi-
ties.”); Schlosberg, supra note 15, at 517-18 (describing the majority of 
existing EJ frameworks as incomplete for their exclusive emphasis on dis-
tributive justice).
48. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10683 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously 273 (1977)).
49. Id. at 10684.
50. See supra note 15.
51. See supra note 45 (describing other prominent frameworks).
52. These goals are best encapsulated by the 17 Principles of Environmental 
Justice developed during the first National People of Color Environmental 
Leadership Summit. See supra note 15.
53. “Procedural justice has been defined as ‘the right to treatment as an equal. 
That is the right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity, 
but to equal concern and respect in the political decision about how these 
goods and opportunities are to be distributed.’” Kuehn, supra note 10, at 
10688 (quoting Dworkin, supra note 48).
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recognition of the underlying systemic issues driving ineq-
uity—what Kuehn refers to as social justice.54 Where Kue-
hn’s taxonomy differs from other prominent frameworks is 
that it also accounts for a fourth conception of justice: cor-
rective justice, which can be likened to “retributive justice,” 
“compensatory justice,” “restorative justice,” and “commu-
tative justice.”55 “Corrective justice,” also embodied in the 
17 Principles of Environmental Justice,56 focuses not just 
on equal treatment moving forward, but also on the “duty 
to repair the losses for which one is responsible.”57
Like other prominent EJ frameworks,58 Kuehn views 
these elements of justice as inherently interconnected and 
asserts that all four must be addressed to truly achieve 
EJ.59 So while distributive justice requires fair distribution 
of environmental risks and resources, procedural justice 
requires involving affected communities in processes that 
are designed to be fair, social justice requires recogniz-
ing the broader social context in which these issues arise 
and positioning EJ as part of larger racial and economic 
struggles, and corrective justice requires also redressing 
past harms.
This maximal view of justice may be seen as setting a 
remarkably high bar, however, and this Article does not 
posit that anything short of success on all three fronts is a 
failure. Instead, these notions of justice stand roughly for 
the multifaceted goals of the EJ movement, and are used as 
a framework for evaluating progress across administrations.
II. Measuring Progress Across 
Administrations
Even once settling upon Kuehn’s framework for under-
standing EJ, measuring governmental progress toward 
the goals of distributive, procedural, social, and corrective 
justice remains challenging for at least two reasons: a lack 
of specific performance metrics, and shifting priorities 
and reporting over time. Given the apparent decreased 
importance placed on EJ during the Bush Administra-
tion, it comes as little surprise that EJ reporting is hard 
to come by prior to the Obama Administration. A 2004 
report from the OIG criticized the Bush EPA for its lack 
of EJ integration and reporting, noting that “[a]lthough 
the Agency ha[d] been actively involved in implementing 
Executive Order 12,898 for 10 years, it ha[d] not devel-
54. “A social justice perspective presents environmental justice as part of 
larger problems of racial, social, and economic justice.” Id. at 10699 (ci-
tations omitted).
55. Id. at 10693-94 (citations omitted).
56. Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 15 (including the demand 
“that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the peo-
ple for detoxification and the containment at the point of production”; and 
protection of “the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full 
compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care”).
57. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10693 (citing Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of 
Corrective Justice, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 15, 30 (1995)).
58. See, e.g., Schlosberg, supra note 15, at 521 (“Justice demands a focus on 
recognition, distribution, and participation. They are three interlinking, 
overlapping circles of concern.”); Bullard, supra note 15, at 7 (“The envi-
ronmental justice framework rests on developing tools, strategies and poli-
cies to eliminate the myriad types of unfair, unjust and inequitable condi-
tions and policies.”).
59. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10703.
oped a clear vision or a comprehensive strategic plan, and 
ha[d] not established values, goals, expectations, and per-
formance measurements.”60
Even once the Obama Administration brought a 
renewed focus to EJ, EPA was still criticized for not “devel-
oping and using performance measures to track agency 
progress on its EJ goals.”61 In a 2011 report to Congress, 
GAO concluded the following:
EPA’s renewed commitment to environmental justice has 
led to a number of actions, including revitalizing stake-
holders’ involvement and developing agencywide imple-
mentation plans. . . . [But w]ithout performance measures 
that align with EPA’s Plan EJ 2014 goals, the agency will 
lack the information it needs . . . to effectively assess how 
the agency is performing relative to its environmental jus-
tice goals and the effect of its overall environmental justice 
efforts on intended communities.62
Eight years later, when GAO again evaluated federal EJ 
strategies, it found similar problems with measurement.63 
EPA had largely implemented its recommendations from 
2011, including the recommendation to “include mile-
stones and measures for implementation in its 2020 envi-
ronmental justice action agenda.”64 Of the 15 other agencies 
involved in the EJ IWG, however, only three agencies—
the U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), and U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture—established performance measures 
or milestones for their EJ efforts.65 Of these three agencies, 
only one—HHS—reported on its progress toward achiev-
ing the performance measures or milestones established.66
Additionally, although 14 of the signatory agencies ini-
tially developed EJ strategic plans in 2011, as required by 
the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the 
agencies, and “all have issued at least one annual progress 
report on the implementation of these plans, . . . most have 
not issued such reports every year, as they agreed to do in 
the 2011 MOU.”67 As a result, many agencies can identify 
specific accomplishments they have made in promoting EJ 
but are unable to determine how much progress they have 
made overall.68
Even within EPA itself, which did lay out milestones 
and performance measurements in its EJ 2020 Action 
Agenda, the focus and format of progress reports has 
changed between administrations, making it more diffi-
cult to draw clear comparisons between the Obama and 
60. OIG 2004, supra note 41, at i.
61. GAO, GAO-12-77, Environmental Justice: EPA Needs to Take Ad-
ditional Actions to Help Ensure Effective Implementation 19-31 
(2011).
62. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
63. GAO, GAO-19-543, Environmental Justice: Federal Efforts Need 
Better Planning, Coordination, and Methods to Assess Progress 
(2019).
64. Id. at 3-4.
65. Id. at 22.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 31.
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Trump Administrations’ efforts.69 Given this lack of clearly 
reported metrics, this Article proposes and evaluates three 
alternative metrics for progress: (1) the availability of legal 
recourse for environmental injustice; (2) consideration of 
climate change as an EJ issue; and (3) actions that serve as 
signaling functions, such as proposed funding and consid-
eration of EJ in rulemakings. In addition to being measur-
able, these specific metrics were chosen because they reflect 
the diversity of the movement’s goals and allow us to exam-
ine progress, or reversal thereof, across all four dimensions 
of justice identified by Kuehn.
A. Availability of Legal Recourse
While legal action may not always be an appropriate 
response to EJ “struggles[, which] are at heart political and 
economic, not legal,”70 it is one important way to correct 
past injustices and to prevent further distributional injus-
tice. Understanding whether and how the availability of 
legal recourse has shifted from administration to admin-
istration then can provide some insight into the progress 
made toward correctional and distributional EJ.
EJ litigation to date has generally been founded on one 
of three grounds: traditional environmental laws, equal 
protection, or civil rights laws such as Title VI.71 Unfor-
tunately, all three types of claims have been largely unsuc-
cessful, leaving communities without a promising basis for 
bringing an EJ claim in federal court.72 As a result, Title VI 
administrative claims may offer the best current hope for 
legal recourse for EJ claims and are used here as a compara-
tive metric across administrations.
1 . Limited Availability of Recourse Through 
Federal Courts
In some cases, traditional environmental laws have proven 
successful in addressing environmental harm generally, 
but “[i]n the decades since [their enactment], it became 
clear that [they] have a critical flaw—they fail to address 
the ways that environmental harms disproportionately 
affect low-income people, especially low-income people of 
color.”73 The major environmental statutes “do not address 
the prospect that their benefits and burdens might turn out 
to be unequally distributed in ways that add to cumulative 
disadvantage[, and t]hey do not provide measures to avert 
disparate impact.”74 While these failures may or may not 
be the result of ignorance of distributional concerns,75 they 
functionally prevent affected communities from bringing 
69. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Annual Environmental Justice Progress Reports, https://
www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/annual-environmental-justice-progress-
reports (last updated Feb. 19, 2020) (comparing progress reports from fiscal 
years (FYs) 2015, 2017, and 2019); see also Engelman Lado, supra note 7, at 
302 (noting EPA’s “short-lived” initiative to maintain a web-based docket of 
all Title VI cases).
70. Cole, supra note 16, at 524.
71. Grad, supra note 22, §9.10(4)(b)(i).
72. Id.
73. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 394.
74. Jedediah Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement, 44 Ecology 
L.Q. 809, 825 (2018).
75. Id. at 835 (noting the debate about whether such omissions were intentional).
actionable disparate impact claims on the basis of tradi-
tional environmental law violations. Some scholars have 
even argued that these laws have unintentionally made 
things worse for affected communities, by excluding the 
average citizen from decisionmaking through the “creat[ion 
of] complex administrative processes that exclude most 
people who do not have training in the field and necessitate 
specific technical expertise.”76
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has historically provided another legal hook for EJ 
claims, but they too have been unsuccessful.77 This wide-
spread failure is due largely to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1976 holding in Washington v. Davis78 that a showing of 
discriminatory impact alone is not enough to prove an 
equal rights violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.79 
Instead, the Court held that “the invidious quality of a 
law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately 
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”80 “This is 
not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose 
must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that 
a law’s disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involv-
ing Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination.”81
Invidious discrimination may, in some cases, be inferred 
from disproportionate impact, particularly in circum-
stances when “the discrimination is very difficult to explain 
on nonracial grounds,”82 “but [disproportionate impact] is 
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination 
forbidden by the Constitution.”83 As described above, most 
EJ studies have focused on the correlation between envi-
ronmental harms and race or class, both illustrating and 
resulting in difficulty proving intentional discrimination.84
Another approach,
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, particu-
larly Title VI, has been the other primary vehicle envi-
ronmental justice advocates have attempted to use to fight 
environmental racism. Challenging environmental racial 
discrimination through use of Section 1983 has been 
largely unsuccessful, however, for the same reasons dis-
cussed above with respect to equal protection.85
The provision most often cited in this context, §601 of 
Title VI, provides that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance.”86 Problematically 
76. Cole & Foster, supra note 24, at 30.
77. Cole, supra note 16, at 538 n.73 (collecting cases as of 1994).
78. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
79. Id. at 239 (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or 
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discrimina-
tory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispropor-
tionate impact.”).
80. Id. at 240.
81. Id. at 241.
82. Id. at 240.
83. Id. at 242.
84. See supra Section I.A.
85. Grad, supra note 22, §9.10(4)(B)(iii).
86. 42 U.S.C. §2000d.
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for those wishing to bring a disproportionate impact claim, 
the Supreme Court has also long interpreted this provision 
to prohibit only intentional discrimination.87
Advocates once hoped that successful claims might 
instead be brought under §602, which authorizes fed-
eral agencies “to effectuate the provisions of section 601 
.  .  . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general 
applicability.”88 “While litigants under Title VI itself 
must prove that a defendant intentionally discriminated, 
the regulations implementing Title VI across the federal 
government generally state that discriminatory effect 
(or disparate impact) alone is enough to show unlaw-
ful discrimination.”89 These hopes, however, were largely 
quashed by the Supreme Court’s 2001 holding in Alexan-
der v. Sandoval.90
There, the Court addressed the question of “whether 
private individuals may sue to enforce disparate-impact 
regulations promulgated under [§602 of] Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.”91 Finding that Title VI did not 
“display an intent to create a freestanding private right of 
action to enforce regulations promulgated under §602,” the 
Court held that “no such right of action exists.”92 Thus, at 
this point in time,93 a successful individual right-of-action 
must be filed under §601 and would require the same dif-
ficult showing of intentional discrimination as required 
under the Equal Protection Clause.
2 . Title VI Administrative Claims as a 
Potential Pathway
Unlike a Title VI claim brought in federal court, Title VI 
administrative claims filed with the federal funding agency 
may include claims of discriminatory effect.94 Under Title 
VI, federal agencies have the authority to conduct periodic 
compliance reviews of funding recipients and the duty to 
enforce regulations promulgated under §602.95 EPA’s regu-
lations, enacted in 1973, specifically prohibit EPA-funded 
agencies “from taking acts, including permitting actions, 
that are intentionally discriminatory or have a discrimina-
tory effect based on race, color, or national origin.”96
Within EPA, the External Civil Rights Compliance 
Office (ECRCO, previously the Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR)) is charged with the Agency’s administration of 
Title VI, including with conducting prompt investiga-
87. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
88. 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1.
89. Cole, supra note 16, at 531.
90. 532 U.S. 275, 278 (2001).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 293.
93. Lawmakers continue to propose legislation that would allow for claims 
based on discriminatory impact, including most recently the Environmental 
Justice Act of 2017, S. 1996, 115th Cong. §10 (2017) (proposing to amend 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to create a private right-of-action to bring a 
claim under §602).




96. U.S. EPA, Title VI Laws and Regulations (emphasis added), https://www.
epa.gov/ocr/title-vi-laws-and-regulations (last updated Oct. 30, 2019).
tions of alleged Title VI violations.97 Complaints must 
be filed in writing, and describe the allegedly discrimina-
tory acts within 180 days of the acts, unless the ECRCO 
waives the time limit for good cause.98 The ECRCO will 
alert the complainant and recipient of receipt of the com-
plaint within five calendar days and immediately initiate 
complaint processing procedures.99 Within 20 calendar 
days of acknowledgment of the complaint, the ECRCO 
will complete its preliminary investigation and determine 
whether to accept, reject, or refer the complaint to another 
appropriate federal agency.100 If the ECRCO accepts the 
complaint, the office will notify the “applicant or recipient 
complained against of the allegations and give the appli-
cant or recipient opportunity to make a written submission 
responding to, rebutting, or denying the allegations raised 
in the complaint.”101
Within 180 days of the start of the complaint investiga-
tion, the ECRCO will then complete preliminary findings 
and recommendations for voluntary compliance, which 
the recipient may then choose to comply with or chal-
lenge.102 Alternatively, if the office’s preliminary investiga-
tion reveals no violation, it will dismiss the complaint and 
notify the parties.103 Whenever possible, “[the ECRCO] 
shall attempt to resolve complaints informally,”104 but if 
compliance with this part cannot be assured by informal 
means, EPA has a number of other tools at its disposal, 
including the authority to “terminate or refuse to award or 
to continue assistance [or] . . . any other means authorized 
by law to get compliance, including a referral of the matter 
to the Department of Justice.”105 In measuring availability 
of recourse under Title VI claims, this Article considers 
the Agency’s record in accepting cases for investigation and 
issuing findings of discrimination across administrations.
   ❑ Bush era. Historically, EPA’s adjudication of alleged 
Title VI violations is widely believed to have been inad-
equate.106 An independent review of the OCR conducted 
in 2011 revealed that while EPA’s regulations clearly allow 
the Agency 20 days to decide whether to investigate a for-
mal complaint under the federal rules, and another 180 
days to complete an investigation and issue possible find-
ings of civil rights violations, only 6% of the 247 Title VI 
complaints received between 1993 and October 2010 were 
accepted or dismissed within the 20-day time limit.107
In fact, EPA took more than one year to accept or 
dismiss half of these complaints.108 One complaint was 









106. See, e.g., Deloitte Consulting LLP, Evaluation of the EPA Office of 
Civil Rights Final Report 1 (2011).
107. This report was commissioned by EPA during President Obama’s first 
term and reflects findings from the terms of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and 
Obama (first two years). It is used here to exemplify the Office’s long track 
record of inadequate response. Id. at 19.
108. Id. at 25.
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accepted a full nine years after being received, and another 
was accepted after 10 years.109 Among the reasons suggested 
for this poor performance, the report observed that EPA 
did not provide Title VI compliance guidance to funding 
recipients, and the OCR had no tracking system to moni-
tor investigations and complaints.110
   ❑ Obama era. Despite the continued poor track record 
during the first few years of Obama’s presidency, the Ad-
ministration is credited for acknowledging the Agency’s 
failures in resolving Title VI claims and making some im-
provements to the system of enforcing and ensuring com-
pliance after commissioning the independent review dis-
cussed above.111 Such improvements included developing 
a case resolution manual to provide procedural guidance 
to “ensure EPA’s prompt, effective, and efficient resolu-
tion of civil rights cases”; releasing the External Compli-
ance and Complaints Program Strategic Plan for fiscal 
years (FYs) 2015-2020; identifying 23 deputy civil rights 
officials across the Agency to “support the civil rights mis-
sion and ensure its success throughout EPA”; and mov-
ing enforcement of Title VI claims from the OCR to the 
ECRCO, which is located in EPA’s Office of General 
Counsel.112 EPA under Obama was also recognized for 
beginning to clean up the substantial backlog of Title VI 
cases and for making the first ever findings of discrimina-
tion in the Title VI context, both made on the last day of 
the Obama Administration.113
At the same time, a 2016 report by the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights (USCCR) still criticized EPA as 
unsuccessful “in utilizing its Title VI authority to ensure 
that states and other entities that receive EPA financial 
assistance comply with EPA’s Title VI nondiscrimination 
mandates.”114 According to data the ECRCO shared with 
USCCR, the office received a decreasing number of new 
complaints from 2016-2018: 31 in FY 2016, 25 in FY 2017, 
and 15 in FY 2018.115 During FY 2016, which was entirely 
within the Obama Administration, the office accepted 
eight complaints for investigation and rejected three.116 By 
contrast, during FY 2017, which included roughly the final 
quarter of the Obama Administration and the first nine 
months of the Trump Administration, the office accepted 
10 complaints for investigation and rejected 23.117
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR), Environmental Justice: 
Examining the Environmental Protection Agency’s Compliance and 
Enforcement of Title VI and Executive Order 12,898, at 50 (2016) 
[hereinafter USCCR 2016]. But see Engelman Lado, supra note 7, at 301-06 
(describing steps taken under the Obama Administration as “an incremental 
approach to reform” and also as “too little, too late”).
112. USCCR 2016, supra note 111, at 49-50.
113. Engelman Lado, supra note 7, at 303-04; USCCR, Are Rights a Real-
ity? Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Enforcement 399-400 (2019) 
[hereinafter USCCR 2019].
114. USCCR 2016, supra note 111, at 22.
115. USCCR 2019, supra note 113, at 394-95.
116. Id. at 395. The federal government FY runs from October through Septem-
ber, such that FY 2016 ran from October 2015 through September 2016, 
FY 2017 ran from October 2016 through September 2017, and FY 2018 
ran from October 2017 through September 2018.
117. Id.
   ❑ Trump era. This apparent trend toward rejecting an in-
creasing percentage of complaints continued in FY 2018, 
when the office accepted just two complaints for investiga-
tion and rejected 31.118 These numbers are an admittedly 
small sample, representing roughly one-and-one-half years 
of the Trump Administration, but updated case resolution 
info is not readily available through EPA’s website, and 
this data alone shows a marked decrease in the percentage 
of complaints accepted for investigation: from eight to 10 
to two; and a marked increase in the percentage of com-
plaints rejected: from three to 23 to 31.119 Together, these 
numbers could be interpreted as a notable decrease in ac-
cess to legal recourse through the Title VI administrative 
claims process.
   ❑ Comparison. The major progress in resolving Title VI 
claims between the Bush and Obama Administrations is 
largely seen not in the number of claims resolved, but in 
the Agency’s recognition of its long-standing failings and 
its attempts—through training, guidance, and reorgani-
zation—to improve the process. The first ever findings of 
discrimination were also seen at the time as “represent[ing] 
an uptick in activity by a civil-rights office . . . long criti-
cized for failing to act on complaints alleging Title VI 
violations.”120 These findings, however, were both made on 
the last day of the Administration.121
Can two actions taken on the very last day really be said 
to represent much in the way of progress? This “uptick” 
in findings and in general emphasis on claim resolution 
does not seem to have continued into the Trump Admin-
istration. If anything, the decreasing number of claims 
accepted and increasing number of claims rejected may be 
said to signal a reversal of course. But with so few result-
ing formal findings of discrimination, does it really make 
a difference whether complaints are accepted or rejected in 
the first instance?
   ❑ Applying Kuehn’s taxonomy. The answer to these ques-
tions may depend in part upon the notion of justice con-
sidered here. Kuehn himself described Title VI claims 
of disproportionate impact as reflecting distributional 
justice concerns, as they seek to remedy the “‘dispropor-
tionate burden’ or ‘disparate impact’” on a racial class.122 
It could be argued that solely accepting a larger number 
of claims (as under the Obama Administration) did not 
constitute much of a gain in the way of distributional 
justice outcomes when just two formal findings of dis-
crimination were made. It would follow then that not 
much was lost in terms of distributional justice when a 
smaller number were accepted under President Trump. 
118. Id.
119. Id. Complaints accepted and rejected were not necessarily initiated in the 
same FY, so these numbers cannot accurately be expressed as a percentage of 
the overall claims filed in a given year.
120. Id. (citing Talia Buford, Rare Discrimination Finding by EPA Civil Rights 
Office, Center for Pub. Integrity, Jan. 25, 2017, https://publicintegrity.
org/environment/rare-discrimination-finding-by-epa-civil-rights-office/).
121. Id. at 399-400. The findings were also criticized by some advocates for the 
Agency’s “failure to require effective remedies.” Engelman Lado, supra note 
7, at 303.
122. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10684.
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Alternatively, we could extrapolate from the greater ac-
tion (more investigations and actual formal findings of 
discrimination) taken under President Obama that some 
greater substantive outcome would have resulted, had the 
progress continued, so some degree of distributional jus-
tice, and perhaps even the possibility for corrective justice, 
was foregone as a result of the change in administrations. 
 From a procedural justice perspective, there may also 
be more to be said for the benefit of fully investigating a 
larger percentage of claims in that it may indicate greater 
consideration and involvement in decisionmaking: fairer 
treatment and respect under the law. From a social justice 
perspective, the issuance of the first two formal findings of 
discrimination, even if largely symbolic, could be seen as 
an important validation of the broader social, racial, and 
economic justice struggles inherent in EJ. So too could the 
recognition that the Agency was failing in its duties and 
the steps taken to improve the process. Symbols matter 
from a social justice perspective and may therefore repre-
sent important steps toward justice in and of themselves.
B. Consideration of Climate Change as an 
EJ Issue
Climate change is the existential environmental threat of 
our lifetimes, “transforming where and how we live and 
present[ing] growing challenges to human health and 
quality of life, the economy, and the natural systems that 
support us.”123 Because the impacts are expected to, and 
in fact already do, hit lower-income communities and 
communities of color hardest,124 climate change is also 
inescapably an issue of EJ. There is no longer a question 
that increased temperatures are leading to rising sea levels, 
increased extreme weather events, and resulting disruption 
and damage to critical infrastructure, ecosystem services, 
air and water quality, agricultural productivity, and the 
overall vitality of our communities.125
No less real is the well-established fact that the “[i]mpacts 
within and across regions will not be distributed equally. 
People who are already vulnerable, including lower-income 
and otherwise marginalized communities, have less capac-
ity to prepare for and cope with extreme weather and cli-
mate-related events and are expected to experience greater 
impacts.”126 Poor communities have also tended to contrib-
123. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Fourth National Climate 
Assessment, Volume II Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United 
States: Report-in-Brief 26 (2018) [hereinafter Fourth National Cli-
mate Assessment], https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_
Report-in-Brief.pdf.
124. See infra note 126.
125. Fourth National Climate Assessment, supra note 123, at 12-19.
126. Id. at 12. See also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for 
Greenhouse Gases Under Section 20(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 
66496, 66498 (Dec. 15, 2009) (noting that “the Administrator places 
weight on the fact that certain groups, including children, the elderly, and 
the poor are most vulnerable to . . . climate-related health effects”); Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Im-
pacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral 
Aspects (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-PartA_FI-
NAL.pdf (finding that “[c]limate-related hazards exacerbate other stressors, 
ute least to and benefit least from the industrial “progress” 
that has driven human-centered global warming, resulting 
in what some have called an “ecological debt.”127
In this line of thinking, the disproportionate use of 
natural resources by wealthier communities to the dis-
proportionate detriment of poorer communities and 
communities of color128 requires a corrective scheme of dif-
ferentiated responsibility, in which “the countries which 
have benefitted from a high degree of industrialization, at 
the cost of enormous emissions of greenhouse gases, have a 
greater responsibility providing a solution to the problems 
they have caused.”129 For these reasons, an administration’s 
response to climate change, including the degree to which 
it embraces the idea of differentiated responsibility, may be 
used as another barometer of progress toward EJ.
1 . Bush Era
President Bush’s “financial interests in the oil industry 
and his weak environmental record as governor of Texas 
did not inspire optimism” about his approach to climate 
change, so environmental advocates were pleasantly sur-
prised when his EPA Administrator, Christine Todd Whit-
man, “began to stake out a resolute position on climate 
change” early in his Administration.130 However, shortly 
after a “now infamous speech at a G-8 conference of envi-
ronment ministers,” in which Whitman “proclaimed that 
the Bush administration would support an internationally 
coordinated response to climate change,”131 Bush reversed 
course and formally withdrew the United States from the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, which “outlined legally binding 
emissions reductions for developed countries to specified 
amounts below 1990 levels.”132 In so doing, Bush cited 
“incompatab[ility] with domestic energy production goals” 
and the economic harm that the United States would suf-
fer because of a lack of mandatory reduction targets for 
developing countries,133 thus directly rejecting the notion 
of differentiated responsibility for climate change.
On April 19, 2001, leaders of the EJ movement from 
around the world sent a letter to President Bush, express-
ing their “profound concern with [Bush’s] new climate 
change policies with respect to their impacts on poor peo-
ple and people of color in the United States and around the 
often with negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for people living 
in poverty”); Pope Francis, Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common 
Home 20 (2015) (asserting that the poor will feel the impacts of climate 
change most in part because “[t]hey have no other financial activities or re-
sources which can enable them to adapt to climate change or to face natural 
disasters, and their access to social services and protection is very limited”).
127. Pope Francis, supra note 126, at 36-37.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 34 (quoting Bolivian Bishops’ Conference, Pastoral Letter on the En-
vironment and Human Development in Bolivia El Universo, Don de Dios 
Para la Vida 86 (Mar. 23, 2012)).
130. Cohen, supra note 7, at 70-71.
131. Id. at 72.
132. Congressional Research Service, RL31931, Climate Change: Fed-
eral Laws and Policies Related to Greenhouse Gas Reductions 4 
(2008).
133. Cohen, supra note 7, at 71-72.
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world.”134 In it, they accused Bush of siding with oil com-
panies over the poor, allowing poor communities to “face 
a ‘double whammy’—suffering oil’s acute toxic impacts 
first and then its long-term effects in the form of the harsh 
hand of global warming”; and described the Administra-
tion’s “failure to follow through on campaign promises to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions and [the] abandonment 
of the Kyoto Protocol” as “border[ing] on nothing short of 
gross global negligence.”135
The leaders urged President Bush to “reconsider [his] 
position on climate change,” and “severely curb U.S. 
carbon emissions and support the Kyoto Protocol.”136 
Instead, Bush, like his father and President Clinton before 
him, “largely relied on voluntary initiatives to reduce 
the growth of greenhouse gas emissions”137 and contin-
ued to reject mandatory reduction targets throughout his 
presidency.138 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contin-
ued to rise, the effects of climate change intensified, and 
the federal government continued not to recognize that 
the impact would disproportionately be felt by poor and 
minority communities.
2 . Obama Era
The bulk of President Obama’s efforts to fight climate 
change were realized during his second term, at which 
point the president also openly embraced the United 
States’ global responsibility for reducing GHG emissions 
by signing on to the Paris Agreement.139 On November 
1, 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order No. 
13653, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Cli-
mate Change, in which the president explicitly recognized 
that the “impacts [of climate change] are often most sig-
nificant for communities that already face economic or 
health-related challenges,” and the need for “deliberate 
preparation, close cooperation, and coordinated planning 
by the Federal Government, as well as by stakeholders” to 
mitigate such effects and increase the resilience of vulner-
able communities.140
President Obama’s Climate Action Plan put forward a 
“broad-based plan to cut the carbon pollution that causes 
climate change and affects public health” and to “prepare 
the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change.”141 
The promulgation of the final Clean Power Plan (CPP) rule 
was one “important step in [this] essential series of long-
term actions . . . to achieve the GHG emission reductions 





137. Congressional Research Service, supra note 132, at summary page.
138. See, e.g., id. at 9 (noting that the United States described reduction goals 
discussed at the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate 
Change in September 2007 as “aspirational” rather than binding).
139. Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally En-
ters the Paris Agreement, White House, Sept. 3, 2016, https://obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states- 
formally-enters-paris-agreement.
140. Exec. Order No. 13653, 3 C.F.R. 330 (2013) (since repealed).
141. Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action 
Plan 5 (2013) [hereinafter Climate Action Plan].
needed to address the serious threat of climate change.”142 
Citing reports from EPA and the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, the CPP rule identified “CO2 [car-
bon dioxide] [as] the primary GHG pollutant, accounting 
for nearly three-quarters of global GHG emissions and 
82% of U.S. GHG emissions,” highlighting “the urgency 
of addressing the rising concentration of CO2 in the 
atmosphere.”143 The CPP specifically targeted reductions 
in CO2 emissions from electric generating units (power 
plants),144 while other directives and regulations focused 
on increasing fuel economy standards, providing incen-
tives for continued growth in the renewable energy sector, 
cutting energy waste, reducing other GHGs, and leading 
international efforts to address global climate change.145
The CPP rule itself presented climate change as a 
clear EJ issue, and articulated goals to particularly ben-
efit EJ communities:
Low-income communities and communities of color 
already overburdened by pollution are disproportionately 
affected by climate change and are less resilient than oth-
ers to adapt to or recover from climate-change impacts. 
While this rule will provide broad benefits to communi-
ties across the nation by reducing GHG emissions, it will 
be particularly beneficial to populations that are dispro-
portionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change 
and air pollution.146
The CPP also explicitly directed states to consider impacts 
on vulnerable communities, required that states document 
their engagement with these communities, and encouraged 
states to consider how best “to help low-income communi-
ties share in the investments in infrastructure, job creation, 
and other benefits that [renewable energy] and demand-
side [energy-efficiency] programs provide, have access to 
financial assistance programs, and minimize any adverse 
impacts that their plans could have on communities.”147 
Rules such as the CPP then were not only intended to 
achieve distributional justice by reducing the dispropor-
tionate burdens on poor and minority communities, but 
also to achieve procedural justice by involving these com-
munities in decisionmaking processes.
3 . Trump Era
From his time on the campaign trail, however, President 
Trump made rolling back regulations a priority, “explicitly 
and implicitly revers[ing] course on environmental policies 
to the detriment of low-income communities of color,” in 
part through a retreat from climate mitigation and adapta-
tion strategies.148 Since taking office, the Trump Adminis-
142. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64677 (Oct. 23, 
2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 and since repealed).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See generally Climate Action Plan, supra note 141.
146. 80 Fed. Reg. at 64670.
147. Id.
148. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 396-97.
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tration has proposed or completed rollbacks of nearly 100 
environmental rules, many of which were implemented 
with direct or indirect goals of reducing GHG emis-
sions and slowing the speed of climate change.149 Presi-
dent Trump further retreated from climate protection by 
announcing his intention to withdraw the United States 
from the Paris Climate Accord, which he criticized pre-
cisely for its embrace of differentiated responsibility.150
During his first few months in office, President Trump 
issued a series of Executive Orders that clearly signaled a 
move away from the regulatory protections implemented 
during the Obama Administration. In his second week 
in office, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 
13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regula-
tory Costs, directing “that for every one new regulation 
issued, at least two prior regulations be identified for 
elimination, and that the cost of planned regulations be 
prudently managed and controlled through a budgeting 
process.”151 Less than one month later, he issued an Exec-
utive Order, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, 
directing each agency to create a Regulatory Reform Task 
Force to “evaluate existing regulations . . . and make rec-
ommendations to the agency head regarding their repeal, 
replacement, or modification.”152
Soon thereafter, the president issued yet another Exec-
utive Order in the same vein, aimed specifically at the 
energy industry.153 The Order declared a national interest 
in “promot[ing] clean and safe development of our Nation’s 
vast energy resources, while at the same time avoiding 
regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy 
production, constrain economic growth, and prevent job 
creation”; and directed the heads of agencies to immedi-
ately “review all existing regulations, orders, guidance 
documents, policies, and any other similar agency actions 
(collectively, agency actions) that potentially burden the 
development or use of domestically produced energy 
resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, 
and nuclear energy resources.”154
The Executive Order immediately revoked “Certain 
Energy and Climate-Related Presidential and Regulatory 
Actions,”155 rescinded President Obama’s Climate Action 
Plan and Climate Action Plan Strategy to Reduce Methane 
Emissions, directed the Council on Environmental Quality 
149. See Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Is Reversing Nearly 
100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environment-
rollbacks.html (listing rollbacks).
150. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-
trump-paris-climate-accord/ (referring to the Accord as “the latest example 
of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United 
States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American work-
ers—who I love—and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, low-
er wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production”).
151. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
152. Exec. Order No. 13777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Mar. 1, 2017).
153. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. The presidential actions revoked include the following:
(i) Executive Order 13653 of November 1, 2013 (Preparing the 
United States for the Impacts of Climate Change);
(ii) The Presidential Memorandum of June 25, 2013 (Power Sec-
tor Carbon Pollution Standards);
(CEQ) to rescind its Final Guidance for Federal Depart-
ments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National 
Environmental Policy Act Reviews,156 disbanded the Inter-
agency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse 
Gases, withdrew the IWG’s technical support documents 
on the social cost of carbon for regulatory impact analysis 
“as no longer representative of governmental policy” and 
redefined the social cost of carbon more narrowly, and 
directed EPA to immediately review the CPP and related 
rules and Agency actions for possible suspension, reversal, 
or repeal.157
On July 8, 2019, EPA subsequently published “three 
separate and distinct rulemakings”: (1)  repealing the 
CPP “because the Agency has determined that the CPP 
exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority under the Clean Air 
Act (CAA)”; (2)  finalizing the Administration’s replace-
ment emission guidelines for existing power plants, the 
Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule; and (3)  “finalizing 
new regulations for the EPA and state implementation 
of ACE and any future emission guidelines issued under 
CAA section 111(d).”158
President Trump often characterizes government regu-
lation as unnecessary and excessive,159 and the final rule 
repealing and replacing the CPP makes just this point, 
emphasizing that the new, more limited, ACE guidelines 
are sufficient to protect vulnerable communities:
The EPA believes that this action will achieve CO2 
emission reductions resulting from implementation of 
these final guidelines, as well as ozone and PM2.5 [fine 
particulate matter] emission reductions as a co-benefit, 
and will further improve environmental justice com-
munities’ health. . . .
(iii) The Presidential Memorandum of November 3, 2015 (Miti-
gating Impacts on Natural Resources From Development and 
Encouraging Related Private Investment); and
(iv) The Presidential Memorandum of September 21, 2016 (Cli-
mate Change and National Security).
Id. at 16094.
156. This guidance was not a regulation itself but presented “CEQ’s interpre-
tation of what is appropriate under NEPA [the National Environmental 
Policy Act] and the CEQ Regulations for Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of NEPA.” The guidance recommended, inter alia,
that agencies use projected GHG emissions as a proxy for assessing 
potential climate change effects when preparing a NEPA analysis 
for a proposed agency action; . . . that agencies quantify projected 
direct and indirect GHG emissions; . . . [and] counsel[ed] agencies 
to use information developed during the NEPA review to consider 
alternatives that would make the actions and affected communities 
more resilient to the effects of a changing climate.
 Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate 
Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews, 81 Fed. Reg. 51866 
(Aug. 5, 2016).
157. Exec. Order No. 13783, supra note 153.
158. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to 
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (July 
8, 2019) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR 
Stat. CAA §§101-618.
159. Council of Economic Advisers, The Growth Potential of Deregu-
lation 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
documents/The%20Growth%20Potential%20of%20Deregulation_1.pdf.
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With regards to the repeal, .  .  . the EPA believes that 
the power sector is already on path to achieve the CO2 
reductions required by the CPP, therefore the EPA does 
not believe it would have any significant impact on EJ 
effected communities.
. . .
Moreover, this action does not affect the level of public 
health and environmental protection already being pro-
vided by existing NAAQS [national ambient air quality 
standards], including ozone and PM2.5, and other mecha-
nisms in the CAA.160
These words were, in fact, the only reference to EJ through-
out the 64-page rule.161
In addition to arguing that the CPP and related climate 
policies were unnecessary to achieve emission reductions, 
the Administration has at times argued in the alternative 
that global warming may not be man-made,162 and that, 
even if it were, any emissions reductions made by the 
United States would be virtually meaningless when held 
up against the vast emissions from growing economies like 
China.163 More generally, the Administration argues that 
government “[r]egulations serve as an additional tax on the 
U.S. economy, often making beneficial economic transac-
tions more expensive or preventing them outright.”164 Thus, 
the argument goes, regulations make the United States less 
competitive globally, prove especially costly for small busi-
nesses and entrepreneurs, and perpetuate inequality by 
impacting the most vulnerable the most:
Across households, the burden of government regulation 
falls most heavily on low-income Americans, who spend 
a larger proportion of their income on heavily regulated 
goods including transportation, gasoline, utilities, food, 
and heath care. [A] 10 percent increase in total regulations 
leads to a 0.687 percent increase in consumer prices, with 
the poorest households experiencing the highest overall 
levels of inflation and price volatility. Low-income house-
holds also experience a disproportionate burden of the 
health and safety regulations, a large proportion of which 
protect against low-probability events.165
According to the regulatory impact analysis for the 
repeal of the CPP and promulgation of the ACE rule,166 
however, even when using the modified domestic social 
160. 84 Fed. Reg. at 32574.
161. The final rule repealing the CPP and establishing replacement emission 
guidelines for power plants used the term “environmental justice” just once 
apart from the table of contents. See generally 84 Fed. Reg. 32520.
162. See, e.g., Trump: Climate Change Scientists Have “Political Agenda,” BBC News, 
Oct. 15, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45859325.
163. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, supra note 150.
164. Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 159.
165. Id. at 6-8 (internal citations omitted).
166. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Regula-
tory Impact Analysis for the Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, and 
the Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Exist-
ing Electric Utility Generating Units (2019) (EPA-452/R-19-003).
cost of carbon (SC-CO2)167 adopted under President 
Trump, which only accounts for direct impacts of climate 
change anticipated to occur within the contiguous United 
States, “each of the four illustrative scenarios yield [mil-
lions of dollars of] forgone climate benefits and [billions 
of dollars of] forgone ancillary health co-benefits relative 
to . . . the CPP.”168 Other estimates indicate that rollbacks 
of just six environmental rules that “provide the largest and 
best near-term opportunities to reduce climate pollution” 
are estimated to result in foregoing more than 200 mil-
lion metric tons of GHG reductions.169 It may follow, then, 
that “[w]here exposure to environmental harms dispropor-
tionately tracks racial and income lines, cutting programs 
addressing those harms risks exacerbating them for those 
already most burdened.”170
4 . Comparison
From President Bush to President Obama and from Presi-
dent Obama to President Trump, we see a marked change 
in the approach to climate change. President Bush refused 
to recognize the country’s global responsibility as a lead-
ing GHG emitter and refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol; 
while President Obama embraced the principle of differ-
entiated responsibility, signed on to the Paris Agreement, 
and explicitly recognized the disproportionate impacts of 
climate change on poor and minority communities. Presi-
dent Trump, on the other hand, expressly rejects the notion 
of differentiated responsibility and sees no reason to correct 
the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens. We also 
see a difference in the way EJ drives climate policy between 
the Obama and Trump Administrations—whereas Presi-
dent Obama’s policies devote significant consideration to 
the disparate impacts on EJ communities171 and aim to 
specifically raise up EJ communities, President Trump’s 
policies pay only lip service to EJ concerns172 and seek to 
minimally raise up “all people,” essentially maintaining the 
status quo.
167. “The SC-CO2 is a metric that estimates the monetary value of impacts as-
sociated with marginal changes in CO2 emissions in each year.” Id. at ES-10.
168. Id. at ES-12 to ES-13. It is notable that the accountings in the regulatory 
impact analysis do not even account for adverse health effects associated 
with sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, or other hazardous air pollutants. Id. at 
4-47 to 4-51.
169. State Energy and Environmental Impact Law Center, New York 
University School of Law, Climate and Health Showdown in the 
Courts: State Attorneys General Prepare to Fight 3, 5 (2019).
170. See, e.g., Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 402, arguing that
[a]t a global scale, the Trump Administration’s rejection of climate 
science and repudiation of the Paris Agreement represents a con-
scious refusal to take steps to prevent and—equally important—
protect against climate change impacts. This stance directly harms 
low-income communities of color in the United States and around 
the globe, which are expected to experience the worst environmen-
tal, economic, and health effects of climate change.
171. In the CPP, for example, the term “environmental justice” was mentioned 
46 times. See generally 80 Fed. Reg. 64662.
172. See, e.g., the repeal of the CPP rule and implementation of the ACE rule, 
supra note 161.
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5 . Applying Kuehn’s Taxonomy
Assuming for the moment that the CPP and other Obama-
era climate policies would have resulted in increased pro-
tections for EJ communities, most of these policies (like the 
CPP) never actually went into effect and therefore resulted 
in no measurable impact. The most that might be said then 
in terms of distributional or corrective outcomes between 
the Bush and Obama Administrations is that these poli-
cies may have eventually resulted in such substantive prog-
ress. It follows then that their rollback under the Trump 
Administration, like the rejection of an increasing per-
centage of Title VI claims, can be said to have resulted 
in foregone distributional and corrective justice. There are, 
however, clearer ramifications for procedural and social 
justice at play.
Implementing regulations such as the CPP that care-
fully incorporated considerations of disproportionate 
impacts on particularly vulnerable communities and 
involving such communities in decisionmaking, like the 
improvements made to the Title VI process, constituted 
procedural and social justice progress in and of themselves. 
These actions recognized the underlying inequities and 
provided for fairer processes. In the same way, replacing 
such regulations with rules such as the ACE rule, which 
pay little attention to EJ, stripped EJ communities of pro-
cedural justice and stripped the environmental impacts of 
their broader racial, social, and economic contexts. Add to 
this the rejection, embrace, and repeated rejection of dif-
ferentiated responsibility embodied by the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Paris Accord, and from a procedural or social jus-
tice perspective, current climate policies may very well be 
said to be reversing course on EJ.173
C. Actions That Serve Signaling Functions
Other actions by the Office of Environmental Justice 
(OEJ) and administrations more broadly might best be 
described as “signaling” the importance of EJ issues. Such 
functions both serve social and procedural justice in and 
of themselves by validating the cause and signaling a com-
mitment to addressing the issues, while also potentially 
driving future substantive change that might result in dis-
tributive and/or corrective justice.174 President Clinton’s 
Executive Order on EJ might be seen as one such example, 
in that it acknowledged the “disproportionately high and 
adverse human health or environmental effects of [gov-
173. Credit for this term goes to Uma Outka and Elizabeth Kronk Warner, whose 
article of this name (cited throughout this Article) considers in-depth how 
the Trump Administration has “explicitly and implicitly reversed course on 
environmental policies to the detriment of low-income communities of 
color,” using transitions at EPA, the Dakota Access Pipeline, and the Paris 
Climate Accord to illustrate this point. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 
396-97.
174. “Signaling theory” offers one such explanation for how individual signals 
can drive substantive change through the development of norms. See, e.g., 
Kristin Madison, Government, Signaling, and Social Norms, 2001 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 867, 871 (2001) (reviewing Eric Posner’s book, explaining his argu-
ment “that social norms are created through the aggregation of the actions 
of individuals.  .  .  . As more people send a particular signal, it becomes a 
social norm.”).
ernment] programs, policies, and activities on minority 
populations and low-income populations” and directed 
federal agencies to develop EJ strategies.175 The Order offi-
cially validated community concerns and signaled a desire 
to involve affected communities in addressing those con-
cerns, but itself did not actually change the distribution 
of benefits and burdens, nor did it create any judicially 
enforceable rights.176
The actions that serve signaling functions examined 
here across administrations were chosen to reflect how 
extensively EJ has (or has not) been incorporated into the 
day-to-day operations at EPA and include activity in the 
OEJ, involvement in the EJ IWG, proposed funding for 
EJ, and consideration of EJ in rulemaking. On the surface, 
there are some signals that EJ work has continued much the 
same across administrations, while other signals indicate a 
more variable commitment from administration to admin-
istration, with particular implications for social justice.
1 . Bush Era
Throughout the Bush Administration, EPA was criticized 
by investigators from GAO and the OIG for a “flagging 
dedication to environmental justice.”177 The EJ IWG, 
established under Executive Order No. 12898 to provide 
guidance to federal agencies,178 lay dormant179; and the 
president sought to decrease funding for EJ enforcement 
in all but two of his proposed budgets between 2002 and 
2008, even when Congress twice significantly increased 
the budget appropriated for EJ enforcement.180
175. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 13.
176. The Executive Order stated:
This order is intended only to improve the internal management 
of the executive branch and is not intended to, nor does it cre-
ate any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or proce-
dural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United 
States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. This order shall not 
be construed to create any right to judicial review involving the 
compliance or noncompliance of the United States, its agencies, its 
officers, or any other person with this order.
 Id. §6-609.
177. Villa, supra note 16, at 27.
178. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 13, at §1-102.
179. See Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10388 (stating that the Obama Admin-
istration reconvened the IWG for the first time in more than a decade, 
thus indicating it had not met during the Bush Administration); EJ IWG, 
Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Justice and Executive 
Order 12898, at 2 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter MOU] (indicating a lapse in 
activity by describing the MOU’s purposes as “renew[ing] the process under 
Executive Order 12898 for agencies to provide environmental justice strat-
egies and implementation progress reports” and “establish[ing] structures 
and procedures to ensure that the Interagency Working Group operates ef-
fectively and efficiently”).
180. “There is no specific environmental justice statute to fund environmental 
justice activities in EPA. Consequently, the Office of Environmental Justice 
performs activities using a general Environmental Program Management 
appropriation budget line item; in Fiscal Year 2002, this amounted to ap-
proximately $4.4 million.” OIG 2004, supra note 41, at 4. For FY 2003, the 
president sought to increase funding to $4.98 million. U.S. EPA, Summary 
of the 2003 Budget VII-8 (2002) (EPA-205-S-02-001). For FY 2004, 
the president sought to reduce the budget to $4.73 million. U.S. EPA, 
Summary of the 2004 Budget D-5 (2003) (EPA-205-S-03-001). For FY 
2005, he sought to increase the budget from the $5.04 million enacted for 
FY 2004 to $5.13 million. U.S. EPA, Summary of EPA’s 2005 Budget 
D-5 (2004) (EPA-205-S-04-001). For FY 2006, he sought to reduce it to 
$4.82 million from the $5.03 million enacted for FY 2005. U.S. EPA, Sum-
mary of EPA’s 2006 Budget D-5 (2005) (EPA-S-05-001). For FY 2007, 
Copyright © 2021 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
1-2021 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 51 ELR 10051
Several independent reports from the time help to fur-
ther paint the picture. In 2006, the OIG credited EPA with 
“integrating environmental justice into its programs, poli-
cies, and activities through developing action plans from 
each of the program and regional offices,” while also criti-
cizing the Agency for failing to provide any agencywide 
guidance on EJ program or policy review and not consis-
tently performing such reviews, despite the clear directive 
of Executive Order No. 12898.181 And in a 2005 report to 
Congress, GAO highlighted the Bush EPA’s failure to con-
sider EJ in rulemaking, finding that “EPA generally devoted 
little attention to environmental justice” in clean air rule-
makings between 2000 and 2004.182 “[O]f the 19 clean air 
rules finalized during this period that met [GAO’s] criteria, 
only 3 even included the terms ‘environmental justice’ or 
‘Executive Order 12,898’ in the final rule.”183
Of these three rules, GAO found minimal attention 
paid to EJ in all four phases of rule drafting:
[F]irst, initial reports used to flag potential issues for 
senior management did not address environmental jus-
tice. Second, although EPA guidance suggests that work-
groups should consider ways to build in environmental 
justice provisions early in the rulemaking process, there 
is reason to question whether this occurred for the three 
rules .  .  . Third, although EPA officials told [GAO] that 
for the proposed rules, their economic reviews—which 
are intended to inform decision makers of the social con-
sequences of the rules—considered environmental justice, 
[GAO] found that the reviews for [two of the] rules did 
not include environmental justice analyses. Moreover, 
EPA has not identified all of the types of data necessary 
to perform such an analysis. Finally, in publishing the 
proposed rules (an opportunity for EPA to explain how it 
considered environmental justice), EPA mentioned envi-
ronmental justice in all three cases, but the discussion was 
contradictory in one case.184
Overall, a rather dismal attempt to comply with Executive 
Order No. 12898, and a possible further signal that EPA 
was not prioritizing EJ.
he sought to reduce it to $4.62 million from the $6.40 million enacted for 
FY 2006. U.S. EPA, Budget 2007 D-4 (2006) (EPA-205-S-06-001). For 
FY 2008, he sought to reduce it to $4.58 million from the $4.62 million en-
acted for FY 2007. U.S. EPA, FY 2008 EPA Budget in Brief D-4 (2007) 
(EPA-205-S-07-001). For FY 2009, the format of reporting changed, and 
EJ enforcement began to be listed as two separate line items under Environ-
mental Program & Management Enforcement and Hazardous Substance 
Superfund Enforcement. For FY 2009, the president proposed reducing 
the total EJ budget to $4.57 million from the $7.14 million enacted in 
FY 2008. U.S. EPA, FY 2009 EPA Budget in Brief D4 & D6 (2008) 
(EPA-205-S-08-001).
181. Villa, supra note 16, at 27-28 (citing OIG, U.S. EPA, 2006-P-00034, EPA 
Needs to Conduct Environmental Justice Reviews of Its Programs, 
Policies, and Activities 5-7 (2006)).
182. Id. at 27 (citing GAO, GAO-05-289, Environmental Justice: EPA 
Should Devote More Attention to Environmental Justice When 
Developing Clean Air Rules 3 (2005)).
183. GAO, supra note 182, at 3.
184. Id. at 3-4.
2 . Obama Era
By contrast, the Obama Administration has been credited 
with integrating EJ into the day-to-day work of EPA and 
other federal agencies185 and sending clear signals that EJ 
was an important focus for the Administration.186 Such 
actions included issuing guidance for incorporating EJ into 
rulemaking and encouraging communities to participate 
in permitting processes187; reconvening the EJ IWG for 
the first time in more than a decade and obtaining a com-
mitment from participating federal agencies to develop 
and implement EJ strategies188; developing and releas-
ing EJSCREEN, “an environmental justice mapping and 
screening tool”189; and creating comprehensive EJ strate-
gies, including Plan EJ 2014, “a roadmap to assist EPA in 
integrating environmental justice into all of the Agency’s 
programs, policies, and activities,” and the subsequent EJ 
2020 Action Agenda.190 The Agency not only issued guid-
ance related to EJ, but also followed it, including extensively 
considering EJ in rulemakings.191 The CPP, for example, 
used the term “environmental justice” 46 times.192
In contrast with President Bush’s attempts to decrease 
funding for EJ, President Obama sought to slightly increase 
funding for EJ enforcement in each of his first six proposed 
presidential budgets and then sought to roughly double 
funding for FY 2016 and FY 2017, sending a clear signal 
that he intended to invest heavily in EJ.193
185. Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10390.
186. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.S. EPA, to 
All EPA Employees (Jan. 12, 2010), https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/news-
room_archive/newsreleases/bb39e443097b5df5852576a9006a5a86.html.
187. Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10387 (crediting the Obama Administration 
for these actions) (citing U.S. EPA, Guidance on Considering Environ-
mental Justice During the Development of Regulatory Actions 
(2015); EPA Activities to Promote Environmental Justice in the Permit Ap-
plication Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 27220 (May 9, 2013)).
188. Id. at 10388 (citing MOU, supra note 179).
189. U.S. EPA, What Is EJSCREEN?, https://www.epa.gov/ejscreen/what-
ejscreen (last updated Oct. 28, 2019).
190. U.S. EPA, supra note 16.
191. See supra Section II.B.2.
192. See supra note 171.
193. The proposed presidential budget for FY 2010 was $8.02 million compared 
to the $7.8 million enacted for FY 2009. U.S. EPA, FY 2010 Budget in 
Brief 58-60 (2009) (EPA-205-S-09-001). For FY 2011, the proposed presi-
dential budget called for $8.12 million compared to the $7.1 million en-
acted for 2010. U.S. EPA, FY 2011 Budget in Brief 64-65 (2010) (EPA-
205-S-10-001). For FY 2012, $8 million was proposed compared to the 
$7.6 million annualized under the continuing resolution in FY 2011. U.S. 
EPA, FY 2012 Budget in Brief 80-84 (2011) (EPA-190-S-11-001). For 
FY 2013, $8.01 million was proposed compared to the $7.48 million en-
acted for 2012. U.S. EPA, FY 2013 Budget in Brief 84-89 (2012) (EPA-
190-S-12-001). For FY 2014, $7.55 million was proposed compared to 
the $7.48 million annualized under the continuing resolution in FY 2013. 
U.S. EPA, FY 2014 Budget in Brief 93-97 (2013) (EPA-190-S-13-001). 
For FY 2015, the reporting format changed, and no enacted or annualized 
budget was reported for FY 2014, but $8.5 million was proposed. U.S. 
EPA, FY 2015 Budget in Brief 40 (2014) (EPA-190-S-14-001). For FY 
2016, $14.58 million was proposed, compared to the $7.32 million enacted 
for FY 2015. U.S. EPA, FY 2016 Budget in Brief 75-78 (2015) (EPA-
190-S-15-001). For FY 2017, $15.9 million was proposed, compared to the 
$7.3 million enacted in 2016. U.S. EPA, FY 2017 Budget in Brief 78-81, 
114 (2016) (EPA-190-K-16-002).
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3 . Trump Era
Under President Trump, certain EJ functions appear to 
function in much the same way: the ECRCO continues 
to report “new developments” in Title VI complaints,194 a 
mobile version of the EJSCREEN tool was rolled out in 
2018, and the National Environmental Justice Advisory 
Council continues to meet as regularly as it ever did.195 The 
EJ IWG, revived under President Obama, also continues to 
convene monthly meetings, “though four agencies—DOD 
[U.S. Department of Defense], DOE [U.S. Department of 
Energy], SBA [U.S. Small Business Administration] and 
VA [U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs]—did not attend 
any of the monthly meetings during FY 2018, nor did they 
participate in any working group committees”; and two 
of the agencies—DOD and SBA—did not have a desig-
nated representative at all as of March 2019.196 The agen-
cies had various reasons for not maintaining involvement 
in the IWG, and according to EPA officials, “it is difficult 
to characterize what specific opportunities are missed from 
the lack of representation by an agency.”197
EPA officials recognized, however, “that the limiting fac-
tor for the working group in its efforts to address the exec-
utive order on environmental justice has always been the 
will of leadership across federal government to make clear, 
measurable commitments of those priorities and to ade-
quately resource the attainment of those commitments.”198 
This drop-off in the participation of several agencies may 
or may not have a measurable effect on immediate out-
comes, but it looks like a signal of a decreased focus on EJ.
At the same time, President Trump has consistently 
sought to impose draconian budget cuts on EJ enforcement 
specifically, and enforcement generally,199 despite the fact 
that “[e]nforcement ensures the same level of protections 
across the country, undergirds a credible state enforce-
ment program, drives compliance and innovation, pays for 
itself, saves lives, ensures health and prosperity, and creates 
jobs.”200 Given that polluting facilities tend to be sited in 
or near communities of color and low-income communi-
ties, these communities are most likely to be affected not 
only by cuts to EJ enforcement, but also to enforcement 
generally.201 The president’s first proposed budget sought to 
cut the overall enforcement budget by 24%,202 and to com-
194. U.S. EPA, External Civil Rights Compliance Office—New Developments!, 
https://www.epa.gov/ogc/external-civil-rights-compliance-office-new-devel 
opments (last updated Nov. 6, 2020).
195. U.S. EPA, National Environmental Justice Advisory Council Meetings, https://
www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/national-environmental-justice-adviso-
ry-council-meetings (last updated Oct. 22, 2020).
196. GAO, supra note 63, at 41.
197. Id. at 42.
198. Id.
199. Environmental Protection Network, Environmental Justice: The 
Fair Treatment and Meaningful Involvement of All 2-3 (2017), 
https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/03/Environmental-Justice-Fact-Sheet-519.pdf.
200. Environmental Protection Network, Understanding the Full Im-
pacts of the Proposed FY2020 EPA Budget 12 (2019) [hereinafter EPN 
FY2020], https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/FY2020-Budget-19-pg-Analysis-4.pdf.
201. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 406.
202. Environmental Protection Network, Analysis of Trump Admin-
istration Proposals for FY2018 Budget for the Environmental 
pletely eliminate the budget for EJ enforcement.203 Each 
year since, the president’s proposed budget has sought to 
reduce the EJ enforcement budget by at least 70%.204
President Trump has also sought to reduce the total 
enforcement budget for environmental programs and 
management by 17%, 12%, and 6% for FYs 2019-2021, 
respectively,205 even though EPA was already drastically 
reducing enforcement and penalties even without budget 
cuts.206 The Environmental Protection Network, a group 
of former EPA officials who study the impacts of proposed 
budget cuts, claimed that the proposed cuts to “programs 
that provide environmental protection to low income, 
minority and other vulnerable or overburdened communi-
ties . . . so disproportionately affect those communities that 
there appears to be a conscious decision that they do not 
warrant EPA’s attention.”207 Though Congress has nota-
bly ignored these recommended cuts, choosing instead to 
keep the enforcement budget roughly level since 2016,208 
repeated attempts to cripple EPA’s budget for EJ represents 
“a pattern that may reflect a deliberate effort to reduce sup-
port for those communities.”209
4 . Comparison
This may be the metric by which the Obama Administra-
tion’s commitment to EJ is most visible when compared 
to both the Bush and Trump Administrations. Not only 
did President Obama’s budgets seek to increase, rather 
than decrease, spending on EJ enforcement, but EPA dur-
ing this time undertook new initiatives to bring increased 
attention to issues of EJ by implementing tools such as 
EJSCREEN and creating the EJ 2014 and EJ 2020 strate-
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gic plans. The Administration also demonstrated its com-
mitment to EJ by implementing guidance to help agencies 
incorporate EJ in rulemakings and clearly doing so in 
EPA’s own rulemakings like the CPP. Some of these signal-
ing actions have continued unchanged during the Trump 
Administration,210 but others, such as consideration of EJ 
in rulemakings and proposed budgets for EJ enforcement, 
have taken a clear U-turn.
5 . Applying Kuehn’s Taxonomy
What then do these signals mean for justice? Again, the 
answer may depend on the notion of justice invoked. Sig-
naling functions themselves may not be said to achieve 
much in the way of substantive outcomes that would 
advance distributional or corrective justice, but espe-
cially when invoked by people or entities in power, they 
can lead to the development of new norms that would 
advance substantive changes.211 Thus, when such signal-
ing functions are decreased or abandoned, we might say 
that distributional and/or corrective justice have been set 
back, though not necessarily reversed or destroyed. To 
comprehensively evaluate these actions, however, we must 
also consider what the implications are for procedural and 
social justice.
Signals such as involvement in the IWG or consider-
ation of EJ in rulemakings may to some degree indicate 
the degree of attention EJ issues are given, such that less 
involvement or lesser consideration may represent less 
procedural justice. Actions that signal a lesser commit-
ment to EJ may also, in turn, discourage community 
participation in decisionmaking. If the government is 
not projecting concern for the issues or explicitly offering 
seats at the table, affected communities may be less likely 
to believe they will find a place. From a social justice 
perspective, actions that signal a lagging commitment 
to EJ may invoke a heavy cost. A lagging commitment 
may be seen as a failure to recognize the importance of 
the issues at hand and an inherent rejection of the eco-
nomic, racial, and social contexts in which environmen-
tal harms occur. In this light, the cause of EJ has been 
210. E.g., new developments in Title VI enforcement and the release of the mo-
bile version of EJSCREEN. An EJ 2024 strategic plan had not been released 
at the time of writing, but given that the EJ 2020 Action Agenda was not 
released until August 2016, an EJ 2024 plan may still be forthcoming.
211. See Madison, supra note 174.
severely harmed by the change in signals from President 
Obama to President Trump.
III. Conclusion
As the analysis above demonstrates, whether EJ has been 
advanced or hindered by the policies of the last three 
administrations depends in part on the notion of justice 
considered. Over the past 20 years, we have gone from an 
administration that paid little attention to Title VI admin-
istrative claims, ignored the disproportionate impacts of 
climate change on low-income communities and com-
munities of color, rejected the principle of differentiated 
responsibility for climate change, and signaled no real 
commitment to EJ; to an administration that recognized 
the failings of the Title VI program and sought to remedy 
them, explicitly identified climate change as an EJ issue, 
embraced the principle of differentiated responsibility, and 
generally signaled a clear commitment to advancing EJ; 
and then back to an administration that has failed to carry 
forward the momentum built around the Title VI process, 
prefers to think of climate change as impacting “all people” 
rather than any particular group(s), explicitly rejects the 
principle of differentiated responsibility, and signals a flag-
ging commitment to EJ overall.
Applying Kuehn’s taxonomy to the three metrics above 
allows a clearer picture to emerge of where progress was 
made and lost between the Obama and Trump Admin-
istrations, and where things have remained roughly the 
same. While it might be said that little was achieved or lost 
in the way of actual distributive or corrective justice, much 
was gained and lost by way of procedural and social justice.
Viewed in this light, President Trump’s policies might 
only have stalled, rather than reversed, progress toward dis-
tributive and corrective justice, but they have more clearly 
reversed procedural and social justice. Recognizing that EJ 
has always been about more than just distributive justice, the 
importance of such progress and setbacks is not only that 
they move us toward or away from distributive and corrective 
justice, but that they reflect forms of justice themselves. How 
difficult this damage is to undo remains to be seen.
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